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ABSTRACT 
The Sheep of the Shepherd of Being: 
Heidegger’s Attunement to Animal Otherness 
by 
Garrett M.S. Baer 
The centrality of Martin Heidegger to contemporary discussions of the animal is notable for 
the lack of debate: despite the explosion of commentary on Heidegger’s thinking of the 
animal, most scholarship adheres closely to the criticisms first made by Derrida.  On this 
reading, Heidegger anthropocentrically construes the animal according to a lack relative to 
the human and founds the human/animal distinction—in continuity with the metaphysical 
tradition—by privileging the human capacity for language, itself construed as a sovereign 
power. In this paper, an alternative reading of Heidegger’s thinking of the animal is proposed 
on the basis of a close textual analysis of Heidegger’s changing understanding of the animal 
throughout the 1920s, as well as the broader methodological context of his most extended 
treatment of the animal, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Against the current 
critical consensus, Heidegger is not offering a theory of the animal—let alone a metaphysical 
and anthropocentric one—but is raising the animal as a question in order to provoke a 
philosophical transformation in his audience. Although this transformative function is, in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger’s primary reason for considering the 
animal, he also develops an explicitly anti-theoretical understanding of the animal. For 
Heidegger, animal life is a fundamentally mysterious realm by which we are always already 
attuned, and he calls for us to let the animal be what it is, rather than to approach it in terms 
of instrumental use or scientific inquiry.
	1 
The Sheep of the Shepherd of Being: 
Heidegger’s Attunement to Animal Otherness 
In the Heraclitus Seminars, Eugen Fink remarks to Heidegger, “You have, one time 
when you came to Freiburg, said in a lecture that the animal is world-poor.  At that time, you 
were underway toward the affinity of the human with nature.”1  In light of contemporary 
readings of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,2 the Freiburg lectures referred to 
here, Fink’s reference to Heidegger’s description of the animal as world-poor is unsurprising. 
But Fink’s characterization of those lectures’ larger context should be striking, for today 
Heidegger’s treatment of the animal is roundly decried as dogmatic—and what Heidegger is 
dogmatic about, on this reading, is the absoluteness of the human/animal divide. Fink, 
however, appears to be suggesting a rather different state of affairs. Rather than upholding 
dogma, Heidegger was underway; rather than separating the human and the animal, 
Heidegger was working toward an understanding of the affinity of the human and nature.3 
Of course, Fink’s relationship with Heidegger and with the lectures in question—
Heidegger dedicated FCM to Fink and the two conducted a seminar together—does not 
render his interpretation decisive, especially given that the contemporary critical consensus 
follows major interpreters of Heidegger.  Although environmental philosophers have drawn 
upon Heidegger’s work since at least the mid-1970s,4 it was Derrida’s late “zoological turn” 
that brought FCM to the center of contemporary discussions of the animal, 5 especially in the 																																																								
1 Martin Heidegger, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67 (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979)146.  
2 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. Williams McNeill and Nicholas Walker 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 177 [hereinafter cited “FCM”]. 
3 Affinity translates Verwandtschaft, which might also be translated kinship, relatedness, relation, or alliance. 
4 For an excellent review of the influence that Heidegger has had upon environmental philosophy, see Trish 
Glazebrook, “Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, ed. 
Francis Raffoul and Eric Nelson (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013) 433-440. 
5 For the notion of a “zoological turn” in Derrida, see Nathan Van Camp, “Negotiating the Anthropological 
Limit: Derrida, Stiegler, and the Question of the ‘Animal,’” Between the Species 15, No. 4 (2011) 57.  Derrida 
first explicitly treats the animal at length in 1986; see “On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the 
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burgeoning sub-field of animal studies.6  Despite the proliferation of secondary texts, most of 
the commentary closely follows the line of thought first laid out by Derrida.  Seizing upon 
the apparent anthropocentrism of the theses guiding Heidegger’s treatment of animality—
“the stone (material object) is worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-
forming”7—Derrida argues that Heidegger anthropocentrically construes the animal 
according to a lack relative to the human and founds the human/animal distinction—in 
continuity with the metaphysical tradition—by privileging the human capacity for language, 
itself construed as a sovereign power.8  On this reading, Heidegger’s continuation of the 
metaphysical tradition’s anthropocentrism is closely tied to his failure to establish the ethical 
relation to the animal with which Derrida and the activist-minded scholars of animal studies 
are concerned.9 In the wake of this Derridean critique, Heidegger’s treatment of the animal is 
widely decried as anthropocentric.10   																																																								
Essex Colloquium, Research in Phenomenology, 17 (1987), 171-188.  Important later texts include Of Spirit, 
The Animal that Therefore I Am, “Awaiting (at) the Arrival,” “Eating Well,” “Heidegger’s Hand,” and the two 
volumes of The Beast and the Sovereign.  
6 See, for just a few examples, Brett Buchanan, “Being with Animals: Reconsidering Heidegger’s Animal 
Ontology,” in Animals and the Human Imagination (New York: Columbia University Press) 265-288; Matthew 
Calarco, “Metaphysical Anthropocentrism: Heidegger” in Zoographies (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008) 15-54; Leonard Lawler, This Is Not Sufficient (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); William 
McNeill, “Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg Lectures, 1929-1930,” in Animal 
Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999) 197-248; Cary Wolfe, “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion“ in Animal Rites (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press) 44-96. 
7 FCM 177. 
8 See Derrida, Of Spirit, 49-51, The Animal that Therefore I Am [hereinafter TATTIA] 32.  For similar 
arguments, see Calarco 50-51; Stuart Elden, “Heidegger’s Animals,” Continental Philosophy Review 39 (2006), 
282; Rafael Winkler, “Heidegger and the Question of Man’s Poverty in World,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 15, no. 4 (2007), 527; David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) 129.  There is another strand of Derrida’s analysis, according to 
which human superiority is founded upon an originary lack or fault (TATTIA 45) 
9 ‘Activist,’ here, is not used in a pejorative sense.  Serious scholars of animal studies are clear about their 
political projects. Aaron Gross, for example—a chair of the steering committee for the “Animals and Religion 
Group” of the American Academy of Religion and author of The Question of the Animal and Religion (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014)—has a long history of animal rights activism and founded the 
nonprofit group Farm Forward.  
10 There are a small number of exceptions to this rule. Scattered sympathetic voices like Michel Haar The Song 
of the Earth, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), an early interpreter of 
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But Fink’s comments suggest that Heidegger’s analysis of the animal has perhaps 
been settled too soon.  In keeping with Fink’s understanding of Heidegger’s thinking in 1929 
as being underway, Heidegger’s thinking of the animal is not a dogmatic theorizing, but an 
attempt to raise the animal itself as a question in order to awaken a philosophical 
transformation in us.  I show this provisional, transformative character of Heidegger’s 
thinking of the animal by considering, first, the development of his understanding of the 
animal throughout the 1920s and, second, the wider methodological context of the animal in 
FCM.  Although the animal does serve a methodological function in FCM, the animal is not 
only a means to an end. For Heidegger, animal life is a fundamentally mysterious realm by 
which we are always already attuned, and he calls for us to let the animal be what it is, rather 
than to approach it in terms of instrumental use or scientific inquiry.  
 
I. The Animal’s World-Poverty in Context 
Between 1924 and 1935, Heidegger’s thinking of the animal changes dramatically.  
The shift in Heidegger’s thinking, from the animal that has world to the animal that has no 
world, pivots around Heidegger’s 1929-1930 exploration of the thesis: the animal is world-																																																								
Heidegger’s engagement with the question of nature, arose prior to the post-Derridean critical consensus or, like 
William McNeill, do not address the ethical issues that the current conversation, for good reason, raises. 
McNeill makes his critical position vis-à-vis most contemporary debate clear: “Only if one isolates the analyses 
of animal Being from their proper context, as tends to happen in contemporary debate, does the thesis that the 
animal is ‘poor in world” appear to merely reinscribe a fundamentally traditional, metaphysical ‘theory’ 
distinguishing the animal from the human.”  William McNeill, The Time of Life (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006) 50.  Giorgio Agamben argues that—for Heidegger—the animal is not radically distinct 
from the human, but is, rather, “the jewel set at the center of the human world.” Giorgio Agamben, The Open: 
Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 68.  This is a problematic 
reading giving Heidegger’s explicit insistences that the animal and the human are separated by an abyss.  The 
reading most in tune with my own is Frank Schalow’s; see “Of Earth and Animals,” in The Incarnality of Being 
(Albany: State University of New York Press,, 2006) 91-116.  He does a particular good job of relating 
Heidegger’s thinking of the animals to his treatment of the dynamic between earth and world—there is little 
specific discussion of FCM. 
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poor. However, this shift—as the relevant texts attest—does not indicate an increasingly 
asymmetrical or dogmatic assertion of the human/animal distinction. The animal is not 
worldless because it lacks something, but because it has something else entirely.  
Heidegger developed his understanding of Being-in-the-world throughout the 1920s, 
but his engagement with Aristotle is of particular importance, for it is in this context that 
Heidegger makes enormous leaps in his formulation of Being-in-the-world in terms of state-
of-mind, understanding, and discourse—with the crucial difference that, as they are being 
formed, the concepts apply to both human and animal life.11  In this period, Heidegger 
understands both humans and animals as life. The animal not only has world, but its way of 
Being is, like that of the human, characterized as being-in-the-world: “‘Life’ refers to a mode 
of being, indeed a mode of being-in-a-world. A living thing is not simply at hand 
(vorhanden)… An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some 
mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it.”12 This identification between the way 
of Being-in-the-world of the animal and the human is more striking given the fact that 
Heidegger is, at this point, not operating with an unrefined understanding of Being-in-the-
world, but developing the idea in the specific terms of understanding, state-of-mind, and 
discourse.  
First, it is in the context of discussing Aristotle’s understanding of πάθος that 
Heidegger develops the concept of state-of-mind, not as a specifically human phenomenon 
but one that characterizes living beings: “These πάθη, ‘affects,’ are not states pertaining to 
ensouled things, but are concerned with a disposition of living things in their world, in the 																																																								
11 For an excellent account of the importance of Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle on his way to Being 
and Time, See Theodore Kisiel, “Part II, Confronting the Ontological Tradition,” in The Genesis of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) 221-301. 
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mode of being positioned toward something, allowing a matter to matter to it.”13  State-of-
mind is understood moreover as an intrinsically corporeal openness shared by animals and 
humans by virtue of—and through which they discover—their bodiliness.14  Second, 
anticipating his later definitions of Dasein, Heidegger suggests that animal understanding 
both discloses world and reveals the Being of the being that understands: “Understanding 
belongs to the mode of Being of human Dasein, and in a certain way it also belongs to the 
mode of Being of animals.  By the very fact that a living being discloses a world, the Being 
of this being is also disclosed to it;”15 “Beings, as living, are the sort of beings in whose 
being Being-there matters to them.”16  Finally, both human and animal Being-in-the-world is 
expressed through discourse—animal φωνή and human λογος—which constitutes a kind of 
being-with-one-another.17    
Because Heidegger is developing his own interpretation of Dasein through his 
reading of Aristotle, it can be difficult to determine when he is presenting his own position 
and when he is paraphrasing Aristotle’s.  But the close identification of the Being of the 
animal and of the human is consistent during this period, suggesting that Heidegger’s 
statements on animal being-in-the-world do represent his own position.  Thus, for example, 
in a 1925 lecture, Heidegger writes: 
Life is the kind of reality that is in a world and in fact in such a way that it has a 
world... People are now pondering on the basic structure and sense of the animal.  But 
we overlook the essential element here if we do not see that the animal has a world.  
In the same way, we too are always in a world in such a way that it is disclosed to and 																																																								
12 Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) 
14.   
13 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy 83. 
14 Ibid. 132-6.  Heidegger’s understanding of state of mind’s corporeality is important to keep in mind in light 
of critiques of the apparent disembodiment of Dasein.   
15 Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) 169. 
16 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy 163. 
17 Ibid. 34, 36. 
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for us.18 
 
However, as Heidegger nears Being and Time, this close identification (“In the same way…”) 
yields to a suggestion of slightly more difference between humans and animals. Later in 
1925, Heidegger explains the sense in which Dasein is “in” the world by analogy with the 
sense in which a snail is ‘in’ its shell,” Heidegger notes that “this analogy is concerned with 
an entity to which we must likewise attribute, in a formal way, the kind of being which 
belongs to Dasein—‘life.’”19  Once we understand “our relationship of being toward the 
world,” then “we can perhaps also determine the worldhood of the animal by certain 
modified ways of considering it.”20  Similarly, in 1926, Heidegger writes, “Even a jellyfish 
already has, when it is, its world.  Something like a world, a being that it itself is not, is 
revealed to it, uncovered.”21  From a close identification of animal and human worlds, 
Heidegger transitions to a subtle distinction: analogy, formally like Dasein, a modification of 
the being of Dasein, something like world.  
Finally, this shift is radicalized in Being and Time.  No longer do animals and Dasein 
share life.  Dasein “may be considered as life,” but only if improperly seen “from the 
viewpoint of biology and physiology.”22  Life is not Dasein.23  No longer are the worlds of 
Dasein and the animal conceived of as analogous; rather, the animal now has an 																																																								
18 “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview” in Becoming Heidegger, 
ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007) 259. Emphasis 
mine.   
19 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992) 165-166. Emphasis mine. 
20 History of the Concept of Time 223.  “The reverse procedure does not work…”  Emphasis is mine.  Also see 
Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. Thomas Sheehand (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010) 181. 
21 Martin Heidegger, “On The Essence of Truth (Pentescost Monday, 1926)” in Becoming Heidegger, ed. 
Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007) 285. Emphasis mine. 
22 BT 290.   
23 BT 75. 
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“environment [Umwelt].”24  Even the possibility of understanding the animal via a 
modification of or analogy to Dasein receives a less neutral expression in Being and Time’s 
brief discussions: “The basic ontological state of ‘living’… can be tackled only reductively 
and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein;”25 “The ontology of life is accomplished 
by way of a privative interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be 
anything like mere-aliveness.”26  In other words, since life shows up as such only within 
Dasein’s world, one would have to first fully work out the way of being of Dasein, and then 
abstract from those elements specific to Dasein until what is left is reduced to its “mere-
aliveness.” It is difficult to see how one could attribute Being-in-the-world, as Heidegger 
once did, to an animal characterized by such “mere-aliveness.”   
After 1930, Heidegger’s take on the animal’s world is remarkably consistent: “the 
animal has no world [Welt], nor any environment [Umwelt]” (1935);27 “The darkening and 
worldlessness [of the animal].  (Earlier as world-poor!  Liable to be misunderstood…)” 
(1936-1938);28 “Plant and animal likewise have no world; but they belong to the covert 
throng of a surrounding into which they are linked” (from a text written between 1935-1937, 
then reworked in 1950 and 1960);29  “Because plants and animals are lodged in their 
respective environments [Umgebung] but are never placed freely into the clearing of being 																																																								
24 BT 84. It should, however, be noted that Heidegger also uses “Umwelt” to refer to “the world of everyday 
Dasein which is closest to it.” See BT 94. 
25 BT 238.  Emphasis mine.  
26 BT 75. See also: “Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can ‘life’ 
as a state of Being be defined a priori and this must be done in a privative manner” (BT 85). 
27 Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000) 47.  
28 Contributions to Philosophy, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2012) 218. 
29 “The Origin of the Word of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1971) 43. 
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which alone is ‘world,’ they lack language” (1946);30  Animal behavior relates to “an 
‘environment’ [Umgebungsbezug]” while Dasein relates to a “world [Weltbezug]”(1952).31  
How should this shift be interpreted?32 Does it represent a more anthropocentric,  
asymmetrical approach to the animal?  FCM stands as the turning point, the last time that the 
animal seems to have anything like world.  What happens here?  Einleitung in die 
Philosophie, a lecture course given in 1928-1929, just prior to FCM, provides a clue.  Here, 
Heidegger expands his well-known triune categorization of ways of Being:  
This does not mean that other beings would not really be, but only that the way of 
Being of other beings is fundamentally different.  Animals and plants live; material 
things, “Nature” in an entirely determined sense, are present-at-hand, things of use 
are ready-to-hand.   Terminologically, this results in the paradox that man does not 
live, but only exists, while a closer interpretation indicates that man precisely does 
not live “in addition,” but that what constitutes the modes of animal and plant Being 
receives a completely different and distinct meaning from life inside of human 
existence, provided the human has life.33 
 
Notable, here, is Heidegger’s abandonment of the ‘reductive’ and ‘privative’ interpretation of 
Being and Time, the preceding analogical approach, and the still-earlier identification of 
human and animal life.   Now, Heidegger suggests, life—that way of Being of animals and 
plants—“receives a completely different and distinct meaning.”  Heidegger’s expansion of 
his conceptual apparatus to include the Being of the animal suggests that the animal is neither 
ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand.  It also suggests a certain turn away from a privileging of 
the human, although what that turn entails will need to be elucidated. Although the animal 																																																								
30 “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
248.  
31 Zollikon Seminars, ed. Medard Boss (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001) 244.  
32 In the secondary literature, where this shift is noticed, it is glossed in negative terms, as if Heidegger once 
granted something, then took it away: for Buchanan, this represents a “retraction;” (Buchanan 93) on Calarco’s 
account, “Heidegger’s discussions of animality after The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics become 
increasingly questionable and dogmatic” (Calarco 28) and Derrida is highly critical of the ethical implication of 
this later shift, describing Heidegger’s description of the animal’s having “no world” as a “brutal formulation" 
(Of Spirit 49). 
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can be treated by Dasein as ready-to-hand (beef- and leather-to-be, not grazing cows), or 
present-at-hand (not my loyal dog, but Canis lupus familiaris of the order Carnivora)—just 
as Dasein can be, and is, inauthentically treated as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand in 
everyday life34—with the animal Heidegger opens his thought to a way of Being with a far 
more ambiguous relationship with Dasein.35  How this entirely other way of Being of life is 
to be understood, however, remains a problem.  Heidegger writes, “The question as to the 
nature of ‘life,’ animality, of plant beings, remains completely closed off.  If we are entirely 
honest, we do not even know today how we should even pose this question, let alone answer 
it.”36  This statement clearly anticipates the following year’s FCM, but suggests a different 
context than that with which contemporary interpreters of FCM are operating.  
The context afforded by this summary of the shift in Heidegger’s approach suggests 
several important points.  First, the dramatic shifts in Heidegger’s approach to the animal 
suggest, at the very least, that Heidegger is quite undogmatically developing his 
understanding of the animal by continually returning to the animal as a question.  Second, by 
the time of FCM, the animal has its own autonomous way of Being: life. Thus in FCM 
Heidegger does not seek to understand the animal’s so-called “poverty in world” by first 
“examining the essence of man and the world-forming character we have claimed for him,” 																																																								
33 Martin Heidegger.  Einleitung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996) 71-72. 
Translation mine. 
34 BT 156, 158, 168. 
35 This opening of an ontological niche for the animal is missed by Derrida in his interpretation of FCM, who 
suggests that, since “the animal is not a Dasein, nor is it Vorhandensein or Zuhandensein for us, …one cannot 
think it or talk of it in terms of existential or of categorical, to go back to the pair of concepts which structure 
the existential analytic of Sein und Seit.  Can one not say, then, that the whole deconstruction of ontology, as it 
is begun in Sein und Zeit and insofar as it unseats, as it were, the Cartesian-Hegelian spiritus in the existential 
analytic, is here threatened in its order, its implementation, its conceptual apparatus, by what is called, so 
obscurely still, the animal?” (Derrida, Of Spirit 57).  Of course, Einleitung of 1928-1929 was not yet published 
when Derrida published Of Spirit.  Still, as I will suggest, this care toward the Being of the animal as distinct 
from Dasein, tools, and theoretical objects is evident in FCM.   
36 Einleitung in die Philosophie 148. Translation mine. 
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but by “clarifying animality itself.” 37  Any interpretation of Heidegger’s treatment of the 
animal must account for this ontological singularity of the animal. Third, Heidegger’s refusal 
to accept the animal as merely a tool for the use of humans or as an object before the 
scientific gaze suggests both that his thinking of the animal should be differentiated from that 
of the Cartesian tradition and that his thinking of the animal might be allied with that of 
contemporary thinkers addressing the question of animal ethics.  Fourth, the fact that, as of 
this 1928-1929 lecture, Heidegger claims that we do not even know how to ask the question 
of life, let alone how to answer it, suggests that what we are looking for in FCM is not an 
answer to the question of life, but an attempt to ask the question.   
 
II. Philosophizing as Questioning 
Heidegger provides an explicit framework for understanding this prioritization of 
questioning in FCM by offering therein a rare account of his methodology of formal 
indication. After neglect usually attributed to inconsistent translation, the scarcity of 
Heidegger’s explanations, and student complaints about Heidegger’s extended treatments of 
methodology in his lectures,38 formal indication has now been recognized as critical to 																																																								
37 FCM 211. 
38 Most notably, Being and Time contains no explanation of the approach, although it makes use of it. Kisiel 
offers the best account of the development of formal indication.  See Theodor Kisiel, The Genesis of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).  Other works that have been 
helpful on the question of formal indication are: John Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden 
King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Matthew Burch, “The Existential Sources of 
Phenomenology: Heidegger on Formal Indication,”  European Journal of Philosophy 21, No. 2 (2011); R. 
Matthew Shockey, “What’s Formal About Formal Indication? Heidegger’s Method in Sein und Zeit,” Inquiry: 
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53, No. 6 (2010);  Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: 
Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” The Review of Metaphysics 47, No. 4 (1994); Ryan Streeter, 
“Heidegger’s Formal Indication: A Question of Method in Being and Time,” Man and World 39 (1997);  
S.J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2006) 
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Heidegger’s work.39  Yet the impact of this scholarship has been narrow—discussion of 
formal indication is still largely confined to analyses of the development of Heidegger’s early 
thinking, of method, and of Being and Time—and the implications that an understanding of 
formal indication might have for Heidegger’s treatment of the animal has not been 
considered.  For example, neither David Farrell Krell nor Derrida, who offer the most 
extensive commentaries on FCM, even mention formal indication—let alone how it might 
relate to the animal—despite the fact that FCM contains one of Heidegger’s few significant 
discussions of it.40 
In his 1920s lectures, Heidegger generally emphasizes three aspects of formal 
indication.  First, the function of formal indication is negative. The “formal” refers to the 
relational-sense, or how one approaches the phenomenon.  The formal indication, as formal, 
“should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon—in the negative sense, 
however, the same as if to warn! A phenomenon must be so stipulated such that its relational 
meaning is held in abeyance.”41  Because we access phenomena from within a particular 
historical context, how they show up to us has been “restricted and fixed through 
tradition”42—e.g. Western philosophy tends to be biased toward the theoretical relational-
sense, viewing phenomena as objects.  The formal indication suspends the how of relating 
such that how to approach the phenomenon becomes a question.  The “indication,” on the 																																																								
39 Gadamer, for example, declares, “All of us should ever be relearning that when Heidegger spoke in his early 
works of ‘formal indication,’ he already formulated something that holds for the whole of his thought.  At issue 
here is something decisive for the entire enterprise of his thinking.”  Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Martin 
Heidegger’s One Path” in Reading Heidegger from the Start, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994) 33. This kind of statement is no longer uncommon in the secondary 
literature on formal indication. 
40 See, in addition to the Derrida texts already cited, David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Derrida and Our Animal Others (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013). 
41 Religious Life 44. 
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other hand, refers to the content-sense, which is likewise held in suspension: “It is 
characteristic of an indicative definition that it precisely does not present fully and properly 
the object which is to be determined.”43  Like how to analyze it, what is being analyzed is 
initially not at all clear.   
Second, however, formal indication cannot be entirely negative: the formal indication 
says something capable of pointing out a way.  “Everything depends,” Heidegger writes, 
“upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still 
intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking.”44 This something that 
serves as the starting point for the investigation is “incomplete” and “improper,” being 
adapted from what “lies closest at hand,”45 but this does not mean that the starting-point is 
arbitrary.   This original indication “must be drawn out of the mode in which the object is 
originally accessible.”46  The formal indication indicates an improper content, drawn from “a 
presentation of today’s situation”47—that is, the situation in which the content being 
indicated has already been experienced— “such that the claim [about the content] is now 
made explicit for the first time.”48  This provisional starting-point, then, is derived from the 
way in which the phenomenon is experienced in the everyday situation, in such a way as to 
render clear the presuppositions implicit in that experience. 
Third, formal indication does not build upon this starting-point, but works through it, 
not towards a final understanding of the phenomenon, but towards an authentic relation with 																																																								
42 Martin Heidegger, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) 
59. 
43 PIA 26. 
44 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 62. 
45 PIA 54.   
46 PIA 17. 
47 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 59. 
48 PIA 17. 
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one’s own historical situation in which one finds oneself. This situation, as the living and 
interpreting of life itself, is the genuine object of the investigation.  To work through the 
improper what without a predetermined how requires that one  
…work one’s way toward the situation… The understanding of the formally 
indicative definition, in actualizing the process of working one’s way toward the 
concrete situation, passes by way of the approach that lies closest at hand.  This 
approach is thrust aside as the understanding progresses, and it is then canceled in the 
appropriation of the genuine situation.49  
 
This process is historical. I appropriate my initial mode of access to phenomena—shaped by 
an inherited tradition that I do not question in my everyday life—by working through that 
tradition and thereby “disclos[ing] the history of the covering up of the subject matter.”50  By 
critically working through the tradition that has shaped my access to phenomena, I never 
arrive at an ‘objective’ origin of that tradition or an ‘original’ experience of that subject 
matter, but must reinterpret both “in a manner appropriate to the changed historical situation” 
in which I find myself.51  The goal of formal indication is not to grasp phenomena 
‘objectively,’ but to establish “an explicit appropriation of our position of looking. This 
position is itself something historical.”52 I reclaim as my own—given the demands and 
possibilities of the present—the tradition that has determined my situation and continues to 
do so as long as I exist. This reclaiming is not a singular event, but an inheritance enacted 
through the questioning of one’s self and one’s world that one travels again and again.  As 
Heidegger puts it, “The authentic foundation of philosophy is a radical, existentiell grasp of 
and maturation of questionableness.”53  It is within this context that Heidegger’s assertion, 
immediately prior to FCM, of the task of posing the question of the animal, should be read. 																																																								
49 PIA 54. Translation slightly altered. 
50 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 59. 
51 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 60. 
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In FCM, Heidegger further clarifies his understanding of formal indication, in a 
manner that directly pertains to the question of the animal, on three points. First, in the early 
explorations of formal indication, Heidegger’s examples are few and narrowly focused.  The 
“I am” and “Being”, 54“the being-there of Dasein (factical life) is being in a world;”55 and the 
“I” (as in “Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am;”56) are all designated formal 
indications.57  This has led some commentators to argue that formal indication is intrinsically 
self-reflexive: it provides the means to non-objectively analyze the Being of that being for 
whom Being is an issue, only addressing one’s self.58 In FCM, however, Heidegger suggests 
a broader range of applicability for formal indication, pointing to “death, resolute 
disclosedness, history, existence,” freedom,59 the ‘as,’60 and “world” as formally indicative 
concepts; all “philosophical concepts,” on this account, are “formally indicative concepts.” 61  
And although all such philosophical concepts thus call upon us to transform our Dasein, 
this—notably, in a work in which Heidegger attempts to treat animality ‘itself’62—“does not 
imply that every philosophical concept is one that can be related to Dasein.”63  Heidegger 
thus suggests that formal indication is relevant to a far broader range of issues in his work 
than is generally supposed. 																																																								
52 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 64. 
53 PIA 28. 
54 PIA 46 
55 Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity 62. 
56 BT 78. 
57 BT 152. In addition, Heidegger points to Augustine’s beata vita and Paul’s proclamation as formal 
indications, but he neither emphasizes this nor draws extensively upon his theoretical discussion of formal 
indication in explaining them.  See The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer 
Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
58 See Shockey. 
59 FCM 296. 
60 FCM 305. 
61 FCM 297. 
62 FCM 211. 
63 FCM 300. 
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 Second, in FCM, the specifically transformative aspect of formally indication is 
explicitly brought to the forefront, where before the negative aspect received the greatest 
emphasis.  The meaning of the “indicative” quality is subtly shifted: “indicative implies the 
following: the meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what 
they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to 
understand is called upon by this conceptual context to undertake a transformation of 
themselves into their Dasein.”64  The “indicative” does not point primarily to the suspended 
content-sense, as it did in 1920-1922, but to the necessity of self-transformation. Thus the 
non-propositional results of philosophy are explicitly specified in FCM: “Metaphysical 
questions remain without an answer… because the kind of answer that consists in 
communicating some established fact is quite inadequate for such questions.”65  Though this 
is implied in the earlier work, the new explicitness of this idea further emphasizes the 
primarily transformative intentions of formal indication.66 
 Third, formal indication is now taken to have decisive implications for interpreting 
the interconnections between concepts.  Rejecting the artificiality of a system, Heidegger 
argues that “since all formally indicative concepts and contexts of interpretation address 
whoever is trying to understand…a properly unique interconnection of these concepts is also 
given… the one and only originary interconnection of concepts is already established 
through Dasein itself.”67  Formally indicative concepts cannot be understood as isolated 
things, but rather are enacted as occurrences in Dasein that are, as occurrences within a 																																																								
64 FCM 297. 
65 FCM 185. 
66 Being and Time, it seems, is unsure on this. Heidegger sometimes suggests that he is simply trying to revive 
the question of the meaning of Being as a question, and sometimes that he is preparing an actual answer 
(though, depending on how one interprets that “answer,” these two suggestions might not be contradictory).  
For just a few examples of the latter, see pg. 38, 40; and of the former, pg. 19, 487.  
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particular situation, intrinsically connected to other phenomena. 
 Given the understanding of formal indication outlined above, we should expect the 
following in his treatment of the animal:  First, in considering the animal, there will first 
occur a negative moment—the warning function of formal indication.  Second, the thesis’ 
indication of the content-sense will be drawn from the way in which the animal is accessed in 
the contemporary situation.   Third, this initial indication of the content-sense of the animal 
will represent a starting-point that will be abandoned as the process of exploring it reveals a 
more original relationship.  Fourth, the thesis will represent less a definition than the opening 
of a question and the conclusion will render the thesis regarding the animal questionable.  
Fifth, the questioning will suggest a task, not fulfilled by the text, demanding a 
transformation of the listener in relation to his or her situation. Sixth, the thesis will not stand 
in isolation, but will be intimately interconnected with a larger context crucial to its 
interpretation.  What follows is a close reading demonstrating the fulfillment of these 
predictions—the first four in section III, and the last two in section IV. 
 
III. The Animal as Question 
 To begin, it is important to note that, for Heidegger, world is a formally indicative 
concept “in an exemplary sense.”68  Heidegger introduces the second part of FCM, which 
treats the animal, by asking: “What is world?”  He then turns to the “comparative 
examination” of man, animal, and stone in the ways that they have world, in order to find an 
“initial understanding” of world.69  Heidegger’s theses——“[1] the stone (material object) is 																																																								
67 FCM 298. 
68 FCM 297. 
69 FCM 185. 
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worldless; [2] the animal is poor in world; [3] man is world-forming”70—should thus be read 
not as definitions of the human, the animal, or the stone, but as formally indicative 
definitions of world.71 As such, what world is remains a question—and thus the meaning of 
the thesis concerning the animal’s world-poverty likewise remains uncertain.   
  Heidegger begins his exploration of his three theses by problematizing them, thus 
fulfilling the negative function of formal indication.  To clarify his three theses, Heidegger 
suggests, it is necessary first to discover “what constitutes the essence of the animality of the 
animal and the essence of the humanity of man,” as well as what constitutes the “living 
character of a living being, as distinct from the non-living being” of the stone.72  But in order 
to analyze man, animal, and stone, we must already have some idea of what they are.  This is 
the problem of content.  Equally troublesome is the problem of the relational-sense.  How do 
“we gain access to the living character of the living being in its essence?”73 Describing 
physiology and behavior is not enough, for this would already assume that what we are 
analyzing is a living being—one that can, moreover, be legitimately subjected to theoretical 
observation—when the very meaning of “living” is the very thing under discussion. The 
problem is thus posed by problematizing the content-sense—what is it we are analyzing 
here?—and the relational-sense—how are we to relate to that content? Thus in keeping with 
formal indicative method, Heidegger begins his investigation with a suspension of the what 
and the how of the analysis. 
Formal indication demands that, in the absence of any stable definition, we must rely 																																																								
70 FCM 177. 
71 Derrida notes this, but this does not prevent him from also reading the second thesis as Heidegger’s definition 
of the animal. “These three theses are theses on world.  They are not theses on the stone, on the animal, or on 
man, but theses on the world” (The Animal that Therefore I Am 151); “Compromised, rather, by a thesis on 
animality…” (Of Spirit 57). 
72 FCM 179. 
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upon a provisional understanding taken by the everyday situation.  In order to move forward, 
Heidegger writes, “both of these questions must be left open, but that also means that we 
must always have some answer ready, however provisional and tentative, in order to guide 
us.”74    Noting that world is a problem, Heidegger suggests that this problem initially arises 
in a Christian context: world is all that is created and the human, as created, is thus also a part 
of the world.75  Heidegger is clear about this definition’s provisionality: “However crude this 
distinction may be… [i]nitially and for some time to come we shall employ the word ‘world’ 
in this ambivalent sense.”76  Thus when Heidegger first introduces the thesis of the animal’s 
world-poverty, it would appear to define the animal as that which “has” less world—that is, 
“the sum total of beings accessible to man or animals alike.”77.  In this case, the distinction 
between human and animal would represent a difference of degree: the bird would know the 
sky and the tops of trees, but not the depths of the oceans explored by submarines; the human 
world would be “greater in range, far more extensive in its penetrability, constantly 
extendable.”78 Stressing that such an approach to the animal is derived from the everyday 
perspective, Heidegger writes, “This is all so obvious that there is no need to discuss it any 
further.  We have long been familiar with such self-evident observations.”79 This beginning 
point would seem to give credence to Derrida’s critique: “whether one wishes to avoid this or 																																																								
73 FCM 179 
74 FCM 179. 
75 FCM 176. 
76 FCM 177. 
77 FCM 193. 
78 FCM 193. 
79 FCM 193. As a source of Heidegger’s three theses, one might point to Max Scheler’s “conception of life in 
terms of its intermediate position between material nature and human existence,” to which Heidegger refers 
(FCM 192). or to Husserl’s Ideas II, which draws upon the same schematization, and which Heidegger 
references with regard to such a schema, in Being and Time (BT 489), or to Aristotle, who provides the context 
for Heidegger’s earliest comparisons between human, animal, and stone.. 
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not, the words ‘poverty’ and ‘privation’ imply hierarchization and evaluation.”80   However, 
Heidegger’s theses, as formally indicative, should not be read as his theses at all, but rather 
as a formulation of the presuppositions undergirding the everyday situation in which we 
come across animals.  
Unsurprisingly, then, Heidegger quickly alters his initial interpretation. Thus the 
initial stage of questioning yields a non-quantitative reevaluation of the terms under 
discussion, one that “allows no evaluative ranking or assessment.”81 For if we simply 
“compare the discriminatory capacity of a falcon’s eyes with that of the human eye or the 
canine sense of smell with our own,” this ranking becomes problematic.82 Further, it becomes 
“questionable even as a question,” whether we can speak of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ animals.  
Rather, Heidegger argues, “Every animal and every species of animal as such is just as 
perfect and complete as any other.”83  Thus the initial theses, which Derrida accurately 
describes as hierarchical, have given way to something else.  The poverty referred to in the 
thesis on animality is not quantitative—and the ‘world’ referred to in “world building’ and 
“poverty in world” likewise “cannot express quantity, sum total, or degree with respect to the 
accessibility of beings.”84 Heidegger attempts a new definition: “Let us provisionally define 
world as those beings which are… accessible in such a way that dealing with such beings is 
possible or necessary for the kind of Being pertaining to a particular being.”85 Turning to the 
animal, it is clear that it has some kind of access to beings.  Thus “the animal’s way of being, 
which we call ‘life,’ is not without access;” since world is defined as “the accessibility of 																																																								
80 Derrida Of Spirit 56. 
81 FCM 194. 
82 FCM 194. 
83 FCM 194. 
84 FCM 195. 
85 FCM 196. 
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beings,” it thus follows that the animal does have world after all.86   
Heidegger thus finds himself in a conundrum: “Our perplexity about what we should 
understand by world and the relationship to world has increased.”87 If world means the 
accessibility of beings, then both man and animal have world; if the thesis of the animal’s 
world-poverty is true, however, then both the animal and the stone would not have world: 
“The animal thus reveals itself as a being which both has and does not have world.”88 In this 
context, it is worth considering Derrida’s protest against Heidegger’s thesis as dogmatically 
presupposing “that there is one thing, one domain, one homogenous type of entity, which is 
called animality in general.”89  As should be evident from the provisional character of the 
investigations, Heidegger is not presupposing anything about animals, but rather raising as a 
question the fact of our presupposition: irrefutably, we do approach particular animals as 
animals on the basis of some prior understanding.90  In order to approach, say a frog, as an 
animal, we must already have some idea of what an animal is in mind. Heidegger thus calls 
to attention the automatic way in which we draw upon these presuppositions, treating them 
for the first time as questionable.  As the defining characteristic of Heidegger’s investigation 
into the animal, this circling is dizzying, but certainly not dogmatic.  Heidegger develops 																																																								
86 FCM 198-199. 
87 FCM 199. 
88 FCM 199. 
89 Of Spirit 57. 
90 Even Derrida does this.  All of those who criticize Heidegger’s distinction between Dasein and the animal do 
this.   Derrida, for example, suggests that the space separating “man” and “animal” is just as significant as that 
separating, for example, the chimpanzee and the ant, and thus that the term “animal” fails to do justice to the 
infinite diversity of that which falls under its purview.  Yet, in defending this suggestion, Derrida necessarily 
makes use of precisely such a presupposed understanding of what constitutes the realm of the animal.  In other 
words, pointing, as he does, to lizards, dogs, protozoa, dolphins, sharks, lambs, parrots, chimpanzees, camels, 
eagles, squirrels, tigers, elephants, cats, ants, silkworms, hedgehogs, and echidnas—but not mentioning, say, 
shoes, electromagnetic radiation, or water—necessarily implies that Derrida is in fact operating with a 
background understanding of what an “animal” is, even if he objects to explicitly thematizing that 
presupposition. See TATTIA 34.  It should also be noted that Heidegger explicitly notes—at the conclusion and 
thus, given the character of formal indication, at the most authentic moment of his analysis most properly 
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several other provisional understandings of the animal, but each is in turn rendered 
questionable. Even Heidegger’s extensive engagement with zoology, which yields a robust 
understanding of the animal in terms of captivation, concludes with a series of decisive 
ambiguities.  
Heidegger’s engagement with zoology should be framed by an understanding of 
formal indication.  Formally indicative definitions purport to lay bare that which is 
presupposed by those who, in the everyday situation, relate to that with which the formal 
indication is concerned.    This understanding of formal indication has major implications for 
Heidegger’s thesis on the animal and for its relationship to zoology.  As a philosophical 
proposition, Heidegger’s thesis on the animal “is a statement of essence.”  As the 
presupposition guiding our understanding ahead of time of what animals are, “it is not a 
statement of essence simply because it holds true of all animals” but, rather, “it holds true for 
all animals because it is a statement of essence.”91  In other words, the thesis—if it is actually 
a statement of essence—is the presupposition upon which particular beings show up to us as 
animals at all. If animals show up to us in a manner contradictory to this thesis, or upon the 
basis of another projection of the essence of the animality, then the thesis is not an accurate 
statement of the essence of animals. Heidegger’s thesis is thus falsifiable.  Is the way of 
Being of the animal as zoology understands it “the condition of the possibility of the animal’s 
poverty in world,” or is it “the animal’s poverty in world which enables us to comprehend” 
the animal as zoology understands it?  “If the latter,” he continues, “then we will also have 
shown the thesis that the animal is poor in world to be a statement of essence concerning 																																																								
Heidegger’s—the infinite incomparable multiplicity of the ways of Being of animals. See FCM 277-278. The 
passage is cited below, p. 37. 
91 FCM 186. 
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animality in general, rather than an arbitrary assertion.”92  What does he find? 
Ultimately, Heidegger determines that contemporary zoology understands the way of 
Being of the animal as captivation.  Heidegger provides a summary of animal captivation 
according to six points: [1] Witholding; [2] Being taken; [3] Absorption; [4] Openness for 
something else; [5] the structure of encirclement; [6] Captivation as behavior’s condition of 
possibility.93   In this absorbed openness, the animal is “taken” by things.94  The animal thus 
has access to things, but not as things; the manifestness of beings is withheld. The animal, as 
captivation, does not have beings as beings; the manifestness of beings as beings is withheld: 
the animal does not have something to which it nevertheless has access—and thus would 
seem to be deprived.  This withholding, this poverty, however, is not the condition of 
possibility of understanding the Being of the animal, but rather is only one “moment” of the 
Being of the animal understood as captivation.95  Heidegger’s thesis thus appears to have 
been falsified, since captivation underlies poverty-in-world, rather than the other way around. 
Heidegger does not shrink back from this result—although it yields, in his ostensible 
conclusions to his engagement with the animal96 to decisive ambiguities.  First, the 
biological understanding of the animal as captivation forces Heidegger to reject his own 
thesis of the animal’s world-poverty:  
Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, let alone 
the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality. At best it is a 
proposition that follows from the essential determinations of animality, and moreover 
one which follows only if the animal is regarded in comparison with humanity… If 
these considerations are unassailable, however, then in the end we must not only 
substantially reduce the significance of our thesis, but must repudiate it altogether. 																																																								
92 FCM 227. 
93 FCM 260. 
94 FCM 247. 
95 “Captivation is the condition of the possibility of poverty in world… The withholding of world belongs as 
one essential moment to captivation.” FCM 271. 
96 FCM 257-267. 
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For the thesis is misleading… it encourages the mistaken view that the being of the 
animal in itself is intrinsically deprivation and poverty.97 
 
Second, Heidegger notes that, despite the apparent falsity of the thesis, nevertheless “it has 
brought us closer to an elucidation of the concept of world.”98  Since the function of the 
investigation was to yield a concept of world, and the thesis appears to have accomplished 
this, then the thesis functioned properly and should not be dismissed. Third, since Heidegger 
has still said little about what “world” actually means, “then we have no right now or at least 
as yet no right to alter our thesis.”99  Fourth, Heidegger turns to a poetic understanding of 
animals, citing St. Paul on the suffering of all creation. Fifth, Heidegger notes that zoology’s 
understanding of the animal is incomplete insofar as it fails to address the question of the 
animal’s death.100  Sixth, Heidegger concludes, “The thesis that 'the animal is poor in world' 																																																								
97 FCM 271. 
98 FCM 272. 
99 FCM 272. 
100 FCM 273. Both Derrida and Krell emphasize that Heidegger denies death to the animal and understand this 
as an assertion of human superiority (Derrida, Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. II 122; TATTIA 154-5l; Krell, 
Daimon Life 297). Heidegger does deny death, in the sense that it has for Dasein, to the animal, but the 
implications of this are more complicated than Derrida or Krell recognize.  For Heidegger, animal captivation 
represents is neither a “static condition” nor a “a rigid framework,” but is, instead, “an intrinsically determinate 
motility” (FCM 265).  Motility—meaning for Heidegger the animal’s “birth, growth, maturing, aging, and 
death,” as well as “genetic inheritance”—thus suggests a historicity of the animal still to be thought (FCM 266).  
Although Heidegger answers the question, “is the death of the animal a dying or a way of coming to an end 
[Verenden]?” by pointing to the latter (FCM 267), what this means is not immediately self-evident.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger similarly argues that, while Dasein dies, the animal comes to an end 
[verenden] (BT 291; translation modified).  In that context, Heidegger was committed to approaching the 
animal only privatively and reductively, such that it does perhaps make sense to speak of a refusal.  In FCM, 
and afterwards, however, Heidegger is not engaging in a privative analysis of the animal.  This difference is 
attested by Heidegger’s later revision of Being and Time.  Whereas, in the original edition, Heidegger writes, “It 
remains a problem in itself to define ontologically the way in which the senses can be stimulated or touched in 
something that merely has life, and how and whether [wie und ob] the Being of animals, for instance, is 
constituted by some kind of ‘time’” (BT 396), Heidegger later substitutes “how and whether [wie und ob]” with 
“how and where [wie und wo],” suggesting that it is no longer a question whether the animal has a kind of time, 
but only how it has that time.  Derrida, although citing the later version, glosses this passage without noting the 
shift:  
 
One of the rare times, perhaps the only time (that needs checking) that Heidegger names the animal in 
Being and Time…it is in order to admit to and put off until later a difficulty (my hypothesis is this: 
whatever remains to be dealt with later will probably remain so forever; later here signifies never).  
What is that difficulty? That of knowing if the animal has time, if it is ‘constituted by some kind of 
time.’ According to Heidegger, that ‘remains a problem’ (TATTIA 22). 
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must remain as a problem, and one which we cannot broach now but which guides” the 
continued analysis of world.101  
 There are a number of ways that one might respond to these conclusions.  One might 
critique Heidegger for being incoherent—it is not clear why Heidegger makes the leaps that 
he does, he does not attempt to justify them, and at least some of the claims seem 
incompatible.  One might note that Heidegger seems to have rejected the results of more than 
sixty pages of dense engagement with zoology on grounds—that is, the turn to poetry and St. 
Paul—that are, at best, underexplained and, at worst, simply not pertinent. But the claim, 
defended by nearly every contemporary interpreter of Heidegger’s FCM, that Heidegger 
dogmatically claims that the animal is world-poor, is not only unsupported in the text, but 
explicitly rejected: the thesis of the animal’s world-poverty, while not outright rejected here, 
is explicitly retained only as a problem, and the thesis’s considerable weaknesses are 
explicitly acknowledged. 																																																								
 
This passage is notable not just because Derrida—although citing the “wie und wo”—mistakenly suggests that, 
for Heidegger, the question is if the animal has time, but also because Derrida claims that Heidegger never 
returns seriously to this question—while citing a passage whose editing testifies to the fact Heidegger does 
return to the question, and has revised his thinking as a result.   
Although Heidegger in FCM still does not attribute Dasein’s kind of dying to the animal, he is not 
thereby depriving the animal of something, but attempting to raise as a question the otherness of the animal’s 
way of having time and coming to an end; that the animal does not die suggests not that the animal lacks 
something, but that it has its own distinct manner of coming to an end that remains mysterious to us. 
Heidegger’s refusal to simply identify the death of Dasein with that of the animal, although seeming to close 
one question, really opens the issue as a question: the animal “cannot die in the sense in which dying is ascribed 
to human beings… Consequently the question concerning the essence of the natural physiological death with 
which the particular living individual comes to die… represents a central problem” (FCM 267).  Moreover, this 
consideration of animal coming to an end raises a series of other questions that remain to be thought: “Birth, 
maturing, aging, and death all too obviously remind us of the being of man, which we recognize as being 
historical… What kind of history do we find in the life process of the individual animal? What kind of history 
does the animal kind, the species, possess?... Can we and should we speak of history at all where the being of 
the animal is concerned?  If not, then how are we to determine this motility? You see that one question gives 
rise to others, that one question is more essential than another, that each question is poorer with respect to its 
answer than the next” (FCM 265-6).  To suggest, then, as the secondary literature does, that Heidegger refuses 
the animal death, or closes a question, misses not only the primary point of his formally indicative engagement 
with the animal, but also the host of questions that are the primary point and that could significantly enrich 
contemporary discussions of animality. 
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 But none of the above does justice to Heidegger’s conclusions. Formal indication 
provides a framework for understanding why Heidegger might wish to leave us with this set 
of problems or questions rather than a firm answer. The path that Heidegger’s thinking of the 
animal follows is a meandering one—we seem to find ourselves arriving again and again 
only at same questions. It is critical, however, to note that the question with which we 
concluded is not the same with which we began. Heidegger writes, 
The only thing that ordinary understanding can see in this circling motion is the 
movement around the periphery which always returns to its original point of 
departure…  Thus it misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the center 
of the circle as such.102   
In the face of formal indication’s semantically-empty content-sense and a suspended 
relational-sense, we are forced simply upon the fact that we have posited these theses and 
that they seem to make a certain kind of sense—but we cannot say why. This motivates a 
process of the questioning that both transforms our relationship to the situation from which 
our initial understandings are derived and clarifies what the genuine questions are.  Thus 
Heidegger writes, early in his treatment of the thesis concerning the animal: 
The question we are confronting concerns the essence of the animality of the animal.  
The task in this connection is to develop this question as a question.  For us the 
development of the question itself is far more essential and important than finding 
some quick and ready answer to it.  For any answer, if it is a true one, is conditional 
and thus changing and changeable.  But what remains as a permanent and recurrent 
task of philosophy is precisely to develop the fundamental difficulty of this question 
properly, to grasp the question concerning the essence of animality and thus the 
essence of life in general in all its questionableness.103 
Although Heidegger does arrive at a well-developed theory of the animal, in the form of 
captivation, this answer does not claim to be a universal statement of essence; further, as 
Heidegger’s sudden moves toward poetry, the methodological usefulness of the thesis of 																																																								
101 FCM 273. 
102 FCM 180. 
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world-poverty, and the reassertion of the question of the animal show, Heidegger does not 
mean his zoology-derived understanding of the animal to be the final word on the matter, but 
merely to clarify what, today, the question of the animal might entail.   
IV. Animal Attunement 
The two remaining considerations regarding the formally indicated animal—that is, 
the transformation of the situation and the larger interconnection of concepts—are closely 
related. In transitioning to the thesis “man is world-forming,”104 Heidegger treats the 
transformed situation that his investigation into the animal has yielded. Leaving behind his 
apparently final conclusion that “the thesis that 'the animal is poor in world' must remain as a 
problem,”105 Heidegger writes, in a passage that has gone virtually unremarked in the 
secondary literature:106 
The task is to reveal the significance of what we acquired there [in the consideration 
of the animal] in its entire import for the question concerning the manifestness of 
beings as such.... In this connection we should remember this: animality no longer 
stands in view with respect to poverty in world as such, but rather as a realm of 
beings which are manifest and thus call for a specific fundamental relationship toward 
them on our part, one in which at least initially we do not move.107  
 
The initial situation of access to the animal, such that the animal shows up as world-poor, has 
given way to a situation in which the failing is ours: animals call for a relationship that we do 
not, in the everyday situation, sustain. Importantly, this decision, that the animal is no longer 																																																								
103 FCM 207. 
104 FCM 275. 
105 FCM 273. 
106 The exception is found in Buchanan 278-9.  He describes it as “a passage that has not received much 
attention.” He does not, however, elaborate on what this “fundamental relationship" specifically entails for 
Heidegger. 
107 FCM 276. 
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to be considered as poor in world, proves final.108  This passage, rather than standing 
alongside the previous concluding moments of his discussion of the animal, provides a 
framework for understanding why he made those sudden moves.  First, Heidegger declares 
that his engagement with the question of the animal yields an insight into the differentiation 
of modes of being. In the situation of everydayness, we consider everything that shows up to 
us as mere objects that all are in the same way: “We board the tram, talk to other people, call 
the dog, loop up at the stars, all in the same way… everything in the same uniformity of what 
is present at hand.”109 Heidegger’s consideration of the animal serves to draw us away from 
this everyday perspective, awakening us to the differentiatedness of beings. Second, 
Heidegger, in concluding that animals “call for a specific fundamental relationship toward 
them on our part”110 opens a path for thinking not only how the formally indicated animal is 
intrinsically interconnected with other aspects of his investigation, but also how it calls the 
listener to a transformation.  Two questions result from this discussion: what characterizes 
the animal’s distinctive way of Being?  What fundamental relationship ought we to have with 
the animal?  
 Heidegger explicitly treats these questions in the context of his attempt to consider 																																																								
108 Never again does Heidegger refer to the animal as world-poor.  At times, he will reference the fact that he 
once ventured such a thesis (See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67 (Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1979) seminar 146; FCM 335, 350), but he does not again commit to it. This fact, 
entirely unnoticed by commentators, who cite Heidegger’s initial thesis on regarding the animal’s world-
poverty as if it represented his own stable and final position, would support my contention that FCM’s 
interpreters have largely failed to consider Heidegger’s thinking in this work as a way that, as formally 
indicative, begins with the everyday situation in which we think the animal only to leave it behind. Τhis leads to 
statements like Krell’s: “Throughout the final hours of the lecture course [i.e. after the thesis of world-poverty is 
explicitly dropped] Heidegger appeals to the animal’s …lack of logos, as the secret of its benumbed behavior in 
an impoverished world” (Daimon Life 129).   On the fixation of the secondary literature with Heidegger’s thesis 
of animal world-poverty, see Elden’s statement: “Poor animals. So poor in world.  This is where most readings 
of Heidegger’s animals begin.  And it is also where most readings end.”  The force of this statement is 
diminished, however, by the fact that Elden himself doesn’t venture far beyond it either; on his reading, in 
Heidegger, “animals are always figured as lacking” (274, 273). 
109 FCM 275. 
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the animal in itself.  How are we to accomplish this? He asks, “Can we transpose ourselves 
into an animal at all?”111 This implies another question: “What is the kind of being which 
belongs to these beings insofar as they permit, resist, or possibly forbid as entirely 
inappropriate any such self-transposition…?”112 For Heidegger, transposition does not mean 
acting “as if” we were animals, “the factical transference of one existing human being into 
the interior of another being,” or “the factical substitution of oneself for another being so as 
to take its place.”113 Nor does transposition mean that we are to empathize with the animal, 
for the same reason that he rejects it in Being and Time as a solution to the problem of the 
‘isolated individual’: it presupposes that “we are ‘outside’ in the first place.”114  
The question of transposition into the animal is, on Heidegger’s account, unique: the 
question of transposition into the stone is self-evidently nonsensical, and that of transposition 
into the other human is also “meaningless, indeed a nonsensical question,” because, as 
Dasein, we are always already transposed into the Being of other Dasein. 115  The animal is 
thus distinctive because the question of transposition appears a meaningful one—“it is 
somehow self-evident that the animal for its part bears with it a peculiar sphere of its own 
that makes possible a transposition into it”116—yet this transposition is also somehow 
refused. Heidegger’s initial claim regarding the animal’s world poverty, which turned into 
the claim that the animal does and does not have world is revealed, more originarily, as an 
expression of the animal’s “potentiality for granting transposedness, connected in turn with 																																																								
110 FCM 276. 
111 FCM 201. 
112 FCM 201. 
113 FCM 202. 
114 FCM 203.  See also BT 162. 
115 FCM 205. 
116 FCM 206. 
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the necessary refusal of any going along with.”117   Thus the investigation of the animal shifts 
from considering solely what the animal is, to considering also our mode of access to the 
animal—we become implicated by the question. 
 To transpose ourselves into the animal means “going along with” the animal in such 
a way that the animal “remain what it is and how it is”118—but also in such a way that we 
remain what we are: transposition “consists precisely in we ourselves being precisely 
ourselves, and only in this way first bringing about the possibility of ourselves being able to 
go along with the other being while remaining other with respect to it.”119  If, as his rejection 
of empathy suggests, we are not outside animals, then in what way are we already going 
along with the animal in this way?  This relationship does not entail simply ignoring the 
animal, but rather demands something of us—for as we have seen, we do not sustain this 
relationship in the everyday situation.    Neither does it entail acting for or on behalf of the 
animal.  As Heidegger puts it in another essay from the same period, “To let be—that is, to 
let beings be as the beings they are”—does not mean “the management, preservation, 
tending, and planning of the beings,” but “to engage oneself with the open region and its 
openness into which every being comes to stand… such engagement withdraws in the face of 
beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are.”120  
Transposing ourselves into the animal requires a withdrawal in which the animals are 
revealed as they are—a description that resonates closely with the attunements that are key to 
the larger project of FCM.  The animal, in our attempt to appropriate the newly disclosed 
situation in which we find ourselves, thus proves to be closely interrelated to a larger set of 																																																								
117 FCM 210. 
118 FCM 202. 
119 FCM 202-203. 
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concerns—precisely what we should expect from formally indicative concepts. 
 It is important to remember that Heidegger’s FCM concerns not animals, but 
metaphysics. Heidegger takes as his first clue to the question of metaphysics a line from 
Novalis: “Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere.” As an urge 
to be at home everywhere, philosophy is precisely uncanny [unheimlich], “not at home 
everywhere;” this “everywhere” means to be “within the whole,” which Heidegger names 
“the world.” 121  Awake to our not being at home in the world, we can then be underway 
toward that whole. This becoming aware of our homesickness arises only in an attunement: 
“Philosophy in each case happens in a fundamental attunement.”122  For Heidegger, the goal 
of the course is to awaken this attunement. 
The first portion of the course, preceding his comparative investigation of world, 
concerns a particular attunement: boredom. But for Heidegger, “what is decisive” is “the 
boredom that today perhaps determines our boredom here and now.”123  The fundamental 
attunement of contemporary man, “the ape of civilization,” who has “long since eradicated 
homesickness,”124 is a distinct form of boredom, one in which “the Dasein in contemporary 
man as such” is bored.125 Heidegger understands boredom in terms of a telling refusal and a 
being held in limbo.  In this particular form of boredom, what is refused, and what oppresses 
us in that refusal, “is the very absence of any essential oppressiveness in our Dasein as a 
whole.”126 We feel at home in the world and, as such, are not driven towards the ‘as a whole’ 
of the world. We flee our being-there by occupying ourselves with things and falling into the 																																																								
120 “On the Essence of Truth” 144. 
121 FCM 5. Note that “Trieb” is the term Heidegger uses to describe the captivated animal’s drivenness. 
122 FCM 7. 
123 FCM 157. 
124 FCM 5. 
125 FCM 162. 
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‘they.’127  Nothing seems to speak to us any longer, and there is no mystery; we fail to 
shoulder our Dasein as a “burden.”128  Profound boredom, by contrast, is precisely the kind 
of fundamental attunement that, for Heidegger, philosophizing requires. In profound 
boredom Dasein is “delivered over to beings’ telling refusal of themselves as a whole.”129  
Beings as such and as a whole withdraw, but Dasein, bound to the horizon of time, cannot 
escape “the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is.”130  Profound boredom—
which the contemporary human flees—thus entails a refusal of beings as a whole that 
discloses that ‘as a whole,’ opening Dasein to the burden of its being there.  Thus the being 
held in limbo here refers to the demand that man “shoulder once more his very Dasein.”131  
Here, Heidegger arrives at a slightly different formulation of the fundamental 
attunement of philosophizing.  He writes, “As a creative and essential activity of human 
Dasein, philosophy stands in the fundamental attunement of melancholy [Schwermut].”132 
Playing with the literal meaning of “Schwermut” as heavy-mood—a mood in which the 
burden of the uncanny [unheimlich] homesickness of Dasein is shouldered—Heidegger thus 
poses melancholy, as another fundamental attunement of philosophy, in opposition to 
contemporary boredom.  
It is in this context of an attempt to awaken an attunement that Heidegger’s 
investigation of the animal should be understood.  Before turning to his comparative 
investigation of man and animal, Heidegger notes, “We are not now leaving this fundamental 
attunement behind us… On the contrary, the elaboration of these questions is nothing other 																																																								
126 FCM 163. 
127 FCM 156. 
128 FCM 172. 
129 FCM 139. 
130 FCM 147. 
131 FCM 171. 
	32 
than an accentuation of the possibility of that fundamental attunement.”133 Immediately after 
his consideration of the animal, Heidegger asks, “Have we already forgotten this fundamental 
attunement in the meantime?... Or does this fundamental attunement still attune us so that… 
we looked into this fundamental attunement as we developed our question”?134  How does 
the investigation of the animal relate to the philosophical attunement of melancholy 
homesickness? We do not simply find ourselves in a particular attunement, in the light of 
which certain things show up as they do, but attunement relates in some sense to the things 
themselves: “Thus, although it is inside, the attunement plays around the thing outside at the 
same time, and indeed without transferring any induced attunement from within us outside 
onto the thing.”135  For Heidegger, attunement is not an inner state we project onto things or 
the result of a causal quality in things; rather, attunement occurs in the ‘between’ in which 
we find ourselves suspended in our being in the world.  Attunement is a “way of being borne 
out into the specific manifestness of beings as a whole.”136 If Heidegger, in FCM, wishes to 
awaken a fundamental attunement of philosophizing, then this cannot be done by 
“deliberating about attunements.”137 The fact that certain beings awaken us to particular 
attunements suggests, however, that Heidegger can awaken an attunement by directing us 
toward a being: not, via assertion, towards its presence-at-hand, but, via formal indication, to 
an authentic experience of the thing itself.  How, then, might the animal attune us?  
 To answer that question, I want to turn to the course’s one explicit discussion of a 
particular animal attunement.  Heidegger’s final dismissal of his zoology-derived 																																																								
132 FCM 183.  
133 FCM 171 
134 FCM 372. 
135 FCM 88. 
136 FCM 283. Also see 290. 
137 FCM 68. 
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understanding of the animal, and his reinstatement of the animal’s world poverty as a 
question, was justified by reference to Paul’s poetic understanding of the suffering of the 
animal.  If the animal is, in its Being, poor [armut], then “a kind of pain [Leiden] and 
suffering [Leid] would have to permeate the whole animal realm and the realm of life in 
general.”138  Zoology cannot speak of this: for this reason, the zoology-derived understanding 
of the animal falsified the thesis of animal-poverty. The poets, however, do speak of such 
suffering: 
In the end we do not first require the Christian faith in order to understand something 
of the saying of St. Paul (Romans VIII, 19) concerning… the yearning expectation of 
creatures and the creation, the paths of which, as the Book of Ezra IV, 7, 12 says, 
have become narrow, doleful [traurig], and weary in this aeon.139 
 
It is passages like this that make FCM, and Heidegger’s treatment of the animal, so much 
more enigmatic than the secondary literature lets on.140  Is Heidegger saying that animals 
yearn or are doleful in themselves, separate from the issue of whether or not we are 
projecting such an attunement onto them?141  This would imply the kind of subject/object 
dualism that Heidegger is concerned to keep at bay, presupposing that we can 
unproblematically transpose ourselves into animals.  																																																								
138 FCM 271. 
139 FCM 272-273. 140	Krell is one of the few authors who analyze this passage closely, and recognize its deeply Schellingian 
resonances.  For Krell, this passage suggests that “the melancholy which Heidegger proclaims the fundamental 
mood of the thinker is arguably common to both Heidegger and those very creatures he is forever trying to 
isolate in an ‘animal-friendly’ zoo” (Derrida and Our Animal Others 118).  According to Krell, this topples 
“the monolithic barrier between humans and other living beings”—which we find only in Heidegger’s “best 
moments”—but ultimately Heidegger pulls back “anxiously” from this insight (Ibid. 118).  Krell proceeds too 
quickly in this interpretation, however, attributing to Heidegger an understanding of attunement foreign to him 
and failing to account for Heidegger’s gesture towards poetry in introducing this passage.  
141 In the secondary literature, Heidegger’s attempt in FCM to consider the animal “in itself” is often glossed 
erroneously.  What does it mean to the let the animal be what it is? Does it mean an “attempt to work through 
the question of animal relation and world from the animal’s perspective” (Calarco 28). Does it mean, as Derrida 
writes, “To relate to the thing such as it is in itself… such as it would be even if I weren’t there” (TATTIA 
160)? Heidegger’s discussion of transposition and letting be suggests that Calarco and Derrida’s suggestions are 
not what is under discussion. 
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That Heidegger turns to poetry from science suggests that the truth of the animal 
primordially comes to expression in a form other than that of propositional λογος.142  The 
possibilities of attunements like the melancholy of animal life come to expression poetically. 
But what does this poetic grief of the animal name? We have seen that homesickness, 
melancholy, and poverty all suggest a kind of inaccessibility and accessibility: a withdrawal 
that discloses.  Heidegger’s treatment of grief [Traurigkeit] suggests the same: 
…The person overcome by grief closes himself off, becomes inaccessible, yet 
without showing any animosity toward us… The manner and way in which we can be 
with him, and in which he is with us, has changed.  It is the grief that constitutes this 
way (the way in which we are together)… It [i.e. attunement] is not at all ‘inside’ in 
some interiority, only to appear in the flash of an eye; but for this reason it is not at 
all outside either.143 
 																																																								
142It is important to note, against the major interpreters of FCM, that it is not the ‘as’ of the propositional λογος 
that distinguishes the animal from the human. Krell for example, argues that Heidegger counterpoises the 
animal to human beings, not as Dasein, but as “those logical, logistical living beings who have the word.” 
(Daimon Life 129). Critics tend to point either to the logos or the ‘as’ as decisive. Of course, these two positions 
are only subtly distinct, since, as Heidegger writes, “the ‘as’-structure for its part is in general the condition of 
the possibility of this logos” (FCM 325). Elden takes the logos argument (282); Derrida and Winkler the “as” 
argument.  See “Awaiting (at) the Arrival” 75, Of Spirit 51 and Winkler 527.   
Heidegger’s own position is, unambiguously, not that the λογος marks the distinction between human 
and animal.  Indeed, in a lecture course in the year following FCM, he suggests that it is not even clear whether 
or not the animal has λογος:  
 
For the matter surely demands that we do not deny λογος to the animal as it now stands—or else leave 
the question open.  And this is the just position that Aristotle unambiguously takes…: ‘No one may 
easily settle, with regard to the ability [of the animal] to perceive, whether this is a capability without 
conversance or a conversant capability [i.e. λογος].’ This caution with regard to deciding and 
questioning must even today remain for us exemplary, irrespective of the further question of where the 
essential boundary runs between animal and human (Aristotle’s Metaphysics 107).  
 
Heidegger’s turn to the ‘as’ and the λογος is formally indicative, and he works through these issues towards 
what, for him, is more fundamental: “the philosophical tradition unknowingly treats—under the title of λογος, 
of ratio, of reason—what we are seeking to unfold as the problem of world” (FCM 350); “The logos is not the 
radical approach to unfolding the problem of world.  This problem must therefore be set aside,” replaced by 
“the effort to transform man, and thereby traditional metaphysics, into a more originary Dasein” (FCM 350).  
The ‘as’ and the λογος  presuppose the manifestness of the world, that is, “a pre-logical being open for beings” 
that “has the character of ‘as a whole’”  (FCM 353). World-formation, which first opens the world, is that 
“fundamental occurrence in the Dasein of man” (FCM 348).  Importantly, and against those critics suggesting 
that what distinguishes man from the animal is some capacity or power, this ισ not a capacity that we possess 
and over which we have power, but rather something that happens to us:  “It is not we who make it, rather it 
happens to us” (FCM 357); we can prepare and wait for this occurrence, but “only whoever honors a mystery 
gains the strength to wait” (FCM 351). 
143 FCM 66. 
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Unsurprisingly, then, given the context, grief similarly implies a kind of inaccessibility of the 
other.  Grief, here, does not describe something the other feels, but the specific “way in 
which we are together,” when the other is somehow inaccessible, closed off.  That, 
poetically, the animal grieves does not mean that the animal has a mood called grief, but that 
the way in which we are together is characterized by grief, in which the animal is somehow 
inaccessible, but that inaccessibility itself discloses a relationship. Grief is not a mood that 
we ‘project’ onto the animal,144 nor a mood that the animal in itself can be said to have, but 
rather ‘plays around’ the animal in the between into which the attunement ecstatically bears 
us.145 
 Heidegger believes that Dasein, as Dasein, is already alongside the animal in such a 
way that going along with is refused. This Being-with is not theoretical, practical, or 
sustained everyday.  Rather, for Heidegger, the fundamental Being-with-the-animal of 
Dasein is a feeling-with, an affective relationship in which Dasein is called to its own 
uncanniness by being attuned to the animal, which is somehow both open and closed to us.   
Though Heidegger, turning to poetry, suggests that perhaps the animal is indeed 
characterized by poverty, Heidegger also suggests two different interpretations of poverty 
[Armut].  The first refers to “a lack or insufficiency” with which most of his zoological 																																																								
144	Heidegger’s rejection of Aristotle’s understanding of poetical metaphor is telling.  On Heidegger’s gloss of 
Aristotle’s account, poets discussing a “melancholy landscape” simply “transfer” the attunement ‘melancholy’ 
“out of [themselves] and onto things”  (FCM 285).  Heidegger, rejecting this, does not then suggest that the 
landscape feels melancholy.  That, according to the poets, nature yearns and life feels melancholy, does not 
mean that animals feel, inside of themselves, these feelings, but that animal life in itself, approached genuinely, 
attunes us in this way, causes the attunement of melancholy to arise in us.  This being attuned to and by things-
—which means neither that the things themselves are attuned in themselves, or that we transfer our feelings to 
things—is what poetic metaphor expresses in a manner that science never could.   
145 On the one hand, this notion of attunement to animal grief would seem to complement well Derrida’s 
insistence that “the first and decisive question would… be to know whether animals can suffer” (TATTIA 27).  
On the other hand, however, Heidegger’s understanding of the suffering of the animal is far more complicated 
than Derrida’s. Given the extensive commentary on the problem of whether or how we are to know the pain of 
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investigation was concerned. This first understanding of poverty is, as we have seen, rejected 
when Heidegger turns, instead, to an understanding of the animal as a realm of beings that 
demands a relationship that, on our part, we fail to sustain.  The second understanding of 
poverty, however, refers to “to the way in which it is deprived, namely the way in which it is 
in a mood—poverty in mood [Ar-mut]:” 
Poverty in this proper sense of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and 
necessarily so.  Yet from such deprivation we can also draw our own peculiar power 
of procuring transparency and inner freedom for Dasein.  Poverty in the sense of 
being in a mood of poverty [Armmütigkeit] does not simply imply indifference with 
respect to what we possess.  On the contrary it represents that preeminent kind of 
having in which we seem not to have.146 
 
When Heidegger reasserts the poetic poverty of the animal over and against zoology, he is 
not saying, with his original thesis, that the animal is poor in the quantitative sense, but rather 
that, if we tune in properly to the Being of the animal, we are attuned by the animal to having 
without having, to letting be, to yearning for this other beyond expressibility.147   
 This poetic poverty of the animal, in the context of a course attempting to awaken the 																																																								
another person (See, for example, Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), Derrida’s gesture seems severely underdeveloped to me. 
146 FCM 195. 
147 Heidegger is clear on the inexpressibility of the animal, presenting as a task for poetry that has not yet been 
accomplished: “What the lark ‘sees,’ and how it sees, and what it is we here call ‘seeing’ on 
the basis of our observation that the lark has eyes, these questions remain to be asked… In fact, an original 
poetizing capacity would be needed to surmise what is concealed to the living being, a poetic capacity to which 
more and higher things are charged, and more essential things (since they are genuinely essential) versus a mere 
hominization of plants and animals” (Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard 
Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) 160.  It is notable that his most extensive later 
engagements with the question of the animal arrive in poetic contexts: Rilke, Trakl, Hölderlin. His discussion of 
yearning [Sehnsucht] also supports this reading of the inexpressibility of the animal: 
The nature of the ground in God is longing [Sehnsucht]?  Here the objection can hardly be made any 
longer that a human state is transferred to God in this statement.  Yes!  But it could be otherwise. Who 
has ever shown that longing is something merely human?  Who has ever completely dismissed the 
possibility with adequate reasons that what we call ‘longing’ and live within might ultimately be 
something other than we ourselves?  Is there not contained in longing something which we have no 
reason to limit to man, something which rather gives us occasion to understand it as that in which we 
humans are freed beyond ourselves?  Is not longing precisely the proof for the fact that man is 
something other than only a man?… As the will of the ground, longing is… a will without 
understanding as such, which, however, foresees precisely being a self in its striving… it is unable to 
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philosophical attunements of melancholy, homesickness, profound boredom, should be 
striking. Heidegger is developing a cluster of intertangled attunements, all of which imply a 
withdrawal that simultaneously gives.  It is not coincidental, then, that it is in this context that 
Heidegger turns to the animal.  The uncanny [unheimlich] circling of Heidegger’s 
engagement with the animal, which Heidegger explicitly points out,148 was not just 
methodological dithering, but represents, rather, Heidegger’s performative enactment of our 
most proper relation to the animal, in which we have without having.  This speaks to the 
animal itself: that the animal permits and does not permit transposition, testifies to the 
animal’s opacity of essence.  But it also explains why Heidegger, wishing to awaken a 
philosophical attunement, would investigate the animal, whose very inaccessibility attunes us 
to the uncanniness of questioning our own being-there. 
This understanding of the attunement that grips us when we open ourselves 
authentically to the animal suggests a way of handling more concretely the question of 
transposition. Heidegger writes, 
Human Dasein is intrinsically a peculiar transposedness in to the encompassing 
contextual ring of living beings… It is not as if we were now on the same level as the 
animals… as though the animals amongst themselves and we amongst them simply 
saw the same wall of beings in different ways… No, the encircling rings amongst 
themselves are not remotely comparable, and the totality of the manifest enmeshing 
of encircling rings in each case is not simply part of the beings that are otherwise 
manifest for us, but rather holds us captive in a quite specific way. That is why we 
say that man exists in a peculiar way in the midst of beings. In the midst of beings 
means: living nature holds us ourselves captive… from out of our essence, whether 
we experience that essence in an originary relationship or not.149 
 
.  Attunement is how we find ourselves in the midst of animals as they actually are—not as a 																																																								
name what it is striving for.  It is lacking the possibility of words (Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence 
of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh  (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985) 124-5. 
148 FCM 180, 187, 
149 FCM 278. Note that various rings are “not remotely comparable”—thus Derrida’s frequent charge that 
Heidegger fails to acknowledge the infinite diversity of life is already addressed. See p. 21 of this essay. 
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matter of sovereign choice, for we held captive by this relationship that always already exists. 
Heidegger’s formally indicative investigation of the animal, by opening the animal as a 
question without settling it, awakens this attunement: not by causing it to exist, but by 
allowing us to open ourselves to the uncanniness of the animal that we have and do not have.   
 This interpretation of nature as that which holds us captive in attuning us to those 
beings in the midst of which we are is borne out by other texts from the same period.  First, 
in a footnote to “On the Essence of Ground” of 1929, Heidegger writes on Being and Time: 
Yet if nature is apparently missing [in Being and Time]…then there are reasons for 
this.  The decisive reason lies in the fact that nature does not let itself be encountered 
either within the sphere of the environing world, nor in general primarily as 
something toward which we comport ourselves.  Nature is originarily manifest in 
Dasein through Dasein’s existing as finding itself attuned [Befindlichkeit-gestimmtes] 
in the midst of beings.  But insofar as finding oneself [Befindlichkeit] (thrownness) 
belongs to the essence of Dasein, and comes to be expressed in the unity of the full 
concept of care, it is only here that the basis for the problem of nature can first be 
attained.150 
 
Here, Heidegger suggests that nature is inaccessible within the everyday world in which 
Dasein—in FCM, out of boredom—busies itself with things and with the ‘they’. Nature is 
accessible only in a fundamental attunement.  FCM, then, by tearing us away from our 
everyday situation, and awakening such an attunement in us, opens this original relationship 
to nature into which we are thrown. As in an authentic relationship to our thrownness, this 
does not, however, entail that nature becomes accessible or that we master it, but only that its 
inaccessibility and our being-subject to it is acknowledged and accepted by us.  Second, in 
1931, shortly after FCM, Heidegger writes, 
The human body is pure nature neither in its mode of immediate givenness nor in its 
way of being.  It is suspended, as it were, between its height and its abyss, as a 
passage-way from the one to the other and as an open dwelling-place for both, but it 																																																								
150 On the Essence of Ground,” in Pathmarks, 370. This is important to note, given how often commentators 
cite the lack of animals in Being in Time as if it reflected an oversight on Heidegger’s thought.   
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is never shut up to itself…The body belongs to the Dasein of man.  Being-there, 
Dasein, in the sense of existence, is a fundamentally different way of being to that of 
nature… And what is it [nature] experienced as?  ‘Natural power’ first manifests 
itself when it intervenes in the region of human powers, as that totality over which 
man is power-less but to which he is bound and by which he is borne along....  Nature 
is primordially present in attunedness.  As soon as man exists he is exposed to the 
sensations received through his body.  This means that he corporeally participates, 
although in his own way, as nature within the totality of nature.  The overarching 
power of nature first reveals itself when man tests his own power and fails.  The 
narrowness, helplessness and powerlessness of the proximate but open environment 
of man is the primordial scene of the appearance of the breadth, supreme power, and 
closedness of nature; the latter cannot exist without the former and vice versa…The 
corporeality of man, however, is not nature, not even when it torments man, rendering 
him powerless and groundless.151 
If Heidegger’s investigations of the animal in FCM seem constantly to fail to reach 
conclusions, this only serves to highlight the fundamentally mysterious fact of our being 
bound to the realm of animal life—a fact that we encounter only “when man tests his own 
power and fails,” showing us that we must let it be what it is.  For Heidegger, we cannot 
come to a comprehensive objective understanding of nature.  This passage also expands 
considerably upon what Heidegger means in FCM when he states that nature holds us 
captive. Although Heidegger, in his first development of state-of-mind in 1924, is explicit 
that mood, attunement, state-of-mind are bodily states, this is rarely emphasized after that 
point. 152  We are, as thrown into corporeality, always already attuned by and to nature as that 
which exceeds us.  Our bodies are a medium over which we have no power through which 
we relate to a nature over which we are powerless. As world-forming, we are thrown into a 
world that is—although it is easy to forget in post-industrial modernity—radically dependent 																																																								
151 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth (New York: Continuum, 2004) 169-170.  This passage also helps in 
interpreting Heidegger’s much-cited reference, in his “Letter on Humanism,” to our “scarcely conceivable, 
abyssal bodily relationship with the animal” (“Letter on Humanism,” in Pathmarks (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 248).  Commentators tend to focus on the “abyssal” rather than the “kinship,” but 
Heidegger does not mean that Dasein and the animal are separated by an abyss, but that our kinship with the 
animal is constituted by the uncanny abyss that we are, as Dasein—the abyss separates, but also, in opening 
difference between two sides, establishes them as next to one another. 
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upon a nature that exceeds our capacity to calculate or master it. The opacity of nature, its 
otherness, Dasein’s powerlessness over it and being-bound to it, and relating to it only by 
means of attunement—all of which are first explored in FCM—receive explicit expression in 
this passage.  These perspectives will remain fundamentally stable for the remainder of 
Heidegger’s life.153 
V. Conclusions 
As late as 1952, Heidegger is clear that he does not and did not seek to resolve the 
question of “animal and man:” “Once again, the task of this work is not to clarify this 
question.  After long consideration, I found a way out which is not an escape but rather 
corresponds only to what is worth questioning in a sufficiently adequate determination of the 
unfolding essence of the human being, animal, plant, and rock.”154 Whether or not 																																																								
152 Note p. 9 in this essay. 
153 In a letter written in the 1950s, for example, Heidegger offers a gloss on FCM: “…it is already sufficient to 
notice that an animal merely is insofar as it moves within an environment [Umwelt] open to it in some way and 
is guided by this environment which itself remains circumscribed by the nature of the animal.  The animal’s 
relationship to this environment, which is never addressed [by the animal itself], shows a certain 
correspondence to the human being’s ex-sistent relationship toward the world.  Thus, in a certain way the 
human being in his ek-sistent Da-sein can immediately participate in and live-with the animal’s environmental 
relationship without ever coming to a congruence between the human being’s being-with and the animal, let 
alone the other way around.  Linguistic useage, according to which one speaks of human and animal ‘behavior’ 
indiscriminately, does not take into account the unfathomable, essential difference between the relationship to a 
‘world’ [Weltbezug] and to an ‘environment’ [Umgebunggezug].  According to its own proper and essential 
relationship to the environment, the animal’s situation makes it possible for us to enter into this relationship, to 
go along with it, and, as it were, to tarry with it.  But it is not enough to consider only that.  It remains far more 
essential to see that an animal (as opposed to a rock) shows itself to us only then as an animal insofar as we 
humans as ek-sistent have engaged in advance in [eingelassen] the relationship to the environment proper to the 
animal.  It does not matter thereby that the immediate apprehension of the environment proper to the animal 
and, thus, also the genuine apprehension of the animal’s relationship to the environment remain inaccessible to 
our knowledge.  The strangeness of the unfolding essence of animals is concealed in this inaccessibility” 
(Zollikon Seminar 243-244).  
In the Heraclitus Seminars of the late 1960s, Heidegger writes, “One can understand organism in the 
sense of Uexküll or also as the functioning of a living system.  In my lecture, which you mentioned, I have said 
that the stone is worldless, the animal world-poor, and the human world-forming… The bodily in the human is 
not something animalistic.  The manner of understanding that accompanies it is something that metaphysics up 
till now has not touched on” (Heraclitus 146). 
154 Zollikon Seminars 243. 
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Heidegger’s attempt to think the animal represents “a splendid failure”155—as Krell presents 
it, “none of the aporias and perplexities…concerning the 1929-1930 lectures ever 
resolve”156—hinges on whether one thinks that the question of life can, or should, be 
answered definitively. 
Heidegger’s answer to this question, first developed in FCM, is clear, and will remain 
fundamentally stable in his later texts—though he is often considerably more explicit in the 
latter.  Heidegger, as in FCM, later critiques the modern consideration of the animal only as 
an object of scientific calculation or instrumental use—“Not only are living things 
technically objectivated in stock-breeding and exploitation…The essence of life is supposed 
to yield itself to technical production”157—and instead endorses an understanding of animal 
life that respects its opacity:   
In metaphysics and in its scientific repercussions, the mystery of the living being goes 
unheeded, for living things are either exposed to the assault of chemistry or are 
transferred to the field of ‘psychology.’  Both presume to seek the riddle of life.  They 
will never find it: not only because every science adheres only to the penultimate and 
must presuppose the penultimate as the first, but also because the riddle of life will 
never be found where the mystery of the living being has already been abandoned.158 
 
Far from denying that Dasein bears no responsibility to living nature, Heidegger suggests that 
this responsibility is central to the occurrence of Dasein, who exists in the midst of beings to 
which it is held captive in attunement. Man, that “ape of civilization,”159 flees the mystery of 
its being-there, distracts himself from his being held-captive by that earth into which he has 
been thrown, by refusing the melancholy and the uncanniness by which he is thus attuned. In 
doing so, the human denies being-tuned to animal life, and thus fails to bear the uncanny 																																																								
155 Krell, Daimon Life 8. 
156 Krell, Daimon Life 297.  Krell, like Derrida focuses in particular on the question of the death of the animal.  
On that, see p. 23fn of this paper. 
157 Poetry, Language, Thought 109. 
158 Parmenides 160. 
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weight of that which distinguishes him from the animal.  In the animal’s captivation 
[Benommenheit,] its drivenness [Getriebenheit], its instinctual drive [Trieb], its driven 
activity [Umtrieb], the animal is not open to anything beyond a specific range of possibilities.  
In Dasein’s ceaseless “urge [Triebe] to be at-home everywhere,” its “restlessness 
[Getriebenheit],” its “busy activities [Umtriebe],”160 in Dasein’s captivation [Benommenheit] 
by things and by publicness,161 Dasein represents the entire world to itself only in terms of 
things, allowing beings to show up only if it has calculated them in advance.  The 
alternative—which Heidegger not only describes, but enacts in his formally indicative 
investigation—is, on Heidegger’s account, a poetic releasement that lets the animal be what 
is, that is, a question attuning us to its mystery.   
 	
																																																								
159 FCM 5. 
160 See FCM 5-6; for Dasein’s “Umtriebe,” see FCM 157, 259, 164. 
161 For the captivation of Dasein by things, see BT 88, 107, 149, 220 and FCM 101; for the captivation of 
Dasein in its everyday absorption into publicness, see BT 316, 220 and FCM 111-112.  Krell notes this use of 
“captivation” in BT, but not in FCM, and thus argues that the use of “benommen” in the latter represents a shift 
in Heidegger’s understanding: “by 1939-30, Dasein has found its feet.  It adopts a braver stance toward beings” 
than in Being and Time (Krell Daimon Life 207). As these passages suggest, however, Heidegger continues to 
use terminology that appear specific to animal to describe Dasein—at least everyday, inauthentic Dasein—as 
well. 
